Married with three children
Private email: ferenc@andrasek.hu
Home page: http://ferenc.andrasek.hu
Nationality: Hungarian
1981– 85 Eötvös Loránd University,
Department of Philosophy,
1970– 73 Kandó Kálmán Faculty of Electrical Engineering,
2014 – retired
1993 – 2014
The Regional Environmental Center for Central and
Eastern Europe
Position: Head of IT and Technical Department
Description: I was responsible for organizing the work of technical staff and
external IT experts.
1992–1993
Mayor’s
Office of Budapest’s XVIIIth District
Position: System administrator
Description: I was the Novell supervisor and technical assistant.
1983–1992
RAMOVILL home electric service
network, Technical Department
Position: Engineer, system administrator
Description: I was responsible for testing and repairing digital and analogue
electronic systems.
1973–1983
Telecommunications Research Institute
Position: Engineer, designer
Description: I was responsible for developing electronic circuits.
Metaphysics, philosophical logic
Abstract
In this paper I utilize the concept of Mealy machines, which I consider to be
models of physical objects. I set up a classification system of finite automata
that is similar to that of the various types of analogue systems. I point out
that the internal states of finite automata correspond to the possible worlds
and that the alternative relation between the possible worlds corresponds to
the possible internal state transitions of automata. The formal properties of
the internal state transitions are determined by the type of the given
automaton. Therefore the type of the automaton defines the formal properties of
the alternative relation, which again determines the logical properties of the
possibility. On the basis of this interpretation one can elaborate the concept
of ‘possibility’. As result, the possible world semantics may be reduced to the
operation and formal properties of automata.
Abstract
The paper has two related central themes. The first is the distinction between
the three existential modes: everyday life, historical time and explanation.
This study presents a cybernetic model for the philosophical interpretation of
the truth problem. The model works electronically. It is based on Tarski’s
insights, and does not touch upon the relevant theory of Kripke and Barwise.
The model provides an arithmetic translation of propositional logic, as the
model of one language in another language. With the help of this translation
the analysis also discusses an electronic model of propositional logic. This
simply means the use of an electronic spreadsheet programme. In the course of
this, I discuss the basic features of Mealy’s theory of finite automata (Finite
State Machines), and then approach the truth problem from this perspective. The
reason I have opted for this way of analysing these problems is because the
delineation of a philosophical problem with the help of a spreadsheet is an apt
example of what is considered to be an easily intelligible explanation in the
21st century. The cybernetic model as such does not form part of the
printed version of this text. The explanation and description of the workings
of the model do not equal the model itself. The latter exists via living,
practical contact with the user, and therefore the contingent time of everyday
life. The model can be downloaded from my website.
The second theme is feedback and paradox. Every truth function corresponds
to an isomorphic digital circuit. Consequently, the logical structure of every
proposition can be presented within the range of propositional logic as an
equivalent digital circuit. Provided that the logical values ‘true’ and ‘false’
correspond to the ‘high’ and ‘low’ voltage levels, the output of a circuit
equivalent with contradiction is always low level for every input state, while
the output of a circuit corresponding to a tautology is always high level,
irrespective of input state. On the other hand, the remaining propositions
correspond to circuits the output of which is high level if and only if some of
the atomic components of the proposition are true, or rather, the inputs
equivalent with the atomic propositions are high level. But what is the
equivalent of a circular statement? The propositions are true or false
irrespective of time, whereas the voltage level of the circuits can change in
time. More accurately, one can say that the input levels of the circuits are
high or low depending on whether we evaluate the atomic formulae of the formula
which expresses the logical structure of the proposition to be true or false,
for the voltage level of the output of the circuit and truth-value of the
formula result from these formulae. I call the digital circuits ‘combinatorial
automata’, which may thus serve to model the formulae of propositional
calculus. Formulae connected with truth functions yield further formulae.
Although there are always corresponding combinatorial automata for these, the
situation is not quite so simple in every case, for we do not find
combinatorial automata joined to each other in each case; it is also possible
that we will not find an automaton – an operating machine or circuit – there at
all. There are digital circuits the output of which is not a function of the
input. The range of automata is wider than that of the combinational automata.
It includes machines the input states of which do not determine unambiguously
their output states, i.e. the output is not a function of the input. This is
because the circuit has a feedback. Most digital circuits belong to this latter
group, which I call the ‘sequential automata’. The question arises as to
whether there is a logical structure of circulating statement that corresponds
to such a sequential automaton (or sequential circuit). In my view, the logical
structure of the Liar Paradox coincides with the operation of a sequential
automaton, irrespective of the logical correctness of the paradox itself.
The analysis also examines possible ways in which the model could be further
developed. The study does not claim to offer the absolute explanation that makes
all other explanations superfluous. It merely states that the model it offers
is worth thinking about and developing.